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Schweitzer: Good News Club

THE SUPREME COURT RULES IN FAvOR OF RELIGIOUS
CLUB'S RIGHT To MEET ON PUBLIC SCHOOL
PREMISES: Is THIS "GOOD NEWS" FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS?
l
Thomas A. Schweitzer

INTRODUCTION

In a significant First Amendment decision which it issued
on June 11, 2001,2 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
request of an evangelical Christian group for children ages 6 to 12,
the Good News Club, ("the Club"), to meet in a public school
cafeteria after school should have been granted because the school
had established a "limited public forum" for outside groups to use
its premises during that time. 3 The First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. . .. "4 Like many important
constitutional law cases, the case involved an apparent collision
between two constitutional rights: the Club's free speech
arguments conflicted with the Establishment Clause arguments of
its adversaries, the Milford Central School authorities in upstate
New York. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held
that the Club had a free speech right to meet as it requested in the
public school and that excluding it from the school because of its
religious character constituted unconstitutional "viewpoint
discrimination." 5 Justice Thomas's opinion was joined by Justices
1Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. M.A.,
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Yale Law School.
2Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), rev'g 202
F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000).
3Id. at 108. The Good News Club is a non-denominational Christian youth
group with chapters around the country which are sponsored by the Child
Evangelism Fellowship, a Christian missionary organization. Good News Club
v. Milford Central School, 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
4U.S. CONST. amend. I. Through the "incorporation doctrine", the Supreme

Court has made the various "clauses" of the First Amendment, which apply in
terms only to Congress, binding also on state and local govemnments. Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296

(1940); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
5Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109, 120.
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Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy, and by Justice Scalia, who
also wrote a concurring opinion.6 Justice Breyer concurred in
part;7 Justices Stevens,8 Souter9 and Ginsburg ° dissented.
This article is a comment on the Good News Club case. Its
purpose is to describe and to analyze the case, to situate it in the
context of free speech and Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
to comment critically on the decision and the relevant issues. The
first half is descriptive; the second is analytical.
The article begins with a description of prior cases in which
student religious clubs sued to challenge their exclusions from
public school premises. Next, it describes the origins of the
dispute between the Club and the Milford School District and
outlines the district court and Second Circuit decisions. Finally, it
summarizes in detail the majority, concurring and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court Justices.
The analytical section begins by outlining the background
of officially prescribed prayer and religious instruction in
American public schools, which lasted more than a hundred years,
starting with the schools' origins in the early Nineteenth Century
and ending only during the last half-century with the Court's
outlawing of school prayer and its mandating of religious
neutrality in the public schools. It is essential to take into account
this history in order to understand and appreciate the fears and
sensitivities of those who oppose permitting religious clubs to meet
on public school premises.
Next, the article analyzes and discusses the two main First
Amendment issues in the case: 1) the free speech question, i.e.,
whether the school district, as part of the local government, was
obliged to afford the Club access to the "limited public forum"
which both sides agreed it had created in the Milford Central
School; and 2) the Establishment Clause question, i.e., whether
permitting the club to meet there would breach the constitutionally
required separation of church and state. Justice Thomas's opinion
6id.
7 Id. at

127.
'Id. at 130.
9 Id. at 134.
'o Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 134 (Justice Ginsburg joined in Justice
Souter's dissent).
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is rather terse and addresses relevant lower court precedent only in

passing, so most of this section relates the Good News Club
decision to the Court's prior cases. The article concludes that the
Court correctly decided both the free speech and Establishment
Clause issues and that its decision poses no threat either to
religious liberty or to the separation of church and state.
PRIOR CASES INVOLVING RELIGIOUS CLUBS AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS

Ever since the Supreme Court first held that the
Establishment Clause was binding on the states in Everson v.
Board of Education,11 in 1947, the Court's jurisprudence in this

area has been marked by bitter internal divisions, seeming
inconsistency and at times incoherence. For example, the familiar
three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,12 to determine whether the
Establishment Clause has been violated, has been criticized by a
majority of Supreme Court Justices1 3 and has; at times been totally

disregarded by the Court14 but has never been officially overruled.
The Supreme Court decisions outlawing the non-denominational
New York Regents-approved prayer 15 and Bible reading in the
11330 U.S. at 16.
12 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."') (citations omitted). See
Thomas A. Schweitzer, Lee v. Weisman: Whither the Establishment Clause and
the Lemon v. Kurtzman Three-prongedTest?, 9 TOURO L. REV. 401 (1993).
13These include Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy.
See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia stated;
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: like some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys
of Center Moriches Union Free School District.
14 E.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding constitutionality
of Nebraska's legislative chaplain against an Establishment Clause challenge).
15 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that recitation of a
government-selected prayer in the public schools 'violates the Establishment
Clause).
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public schools, 16 while controversial when issued, evidently
command majority public support today, as does the decision that
religion can not be taught in public school classrooms, even as part
of a program open without discrimination to teachers of all faiths.17
There have been vigorous dissents, however, to more recent
decisions outlawing officially sponsored prayer at public school
graduations 18 and striking down a school board policy permitting
students to vote to have a student deliver an "invocation" at a high
19
school varsity football game.
EnFel v. Vitale20 and School District of Abington v.
Schempp 2 engendered widespread and emotional public
opposition as well as numerous attempts to amend the First
Amendment, 22 none of which, of course, succeeded. Subsequent
years witnessed a growing number of student Bible and religious
clubs that sought permission to meet in public schools and
colleges,23 a development that might have been spurred by the two
cases. In 1981, the Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent24 held
that the First Amendment was violated when a state college, which
had made its facilities available for meetings of a wide range of
student groups, thereby creating a "limited public forum" for First
Amendment purposes, denied access to a registered student
religious group because of an official regulation barring the use of
University25buildings "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching."
16

Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

17Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
18 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The

history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies featuring
prayers of thanksgiving and petition."); see also Thomas A. Schweitzer, Lee v.
Weisman and the Establishment Clause: Are Invocations and Benedictions at
Public School Graduations Constitutionally Unspeakable?, 69 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 112 (1992).
19See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 590 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the majority's conception of the Establishment Clause).
20 370 U.S. at 421.
21 374 U.S. at 203.
22
See, e.g., MARK G. UDOFF, DAVID L. KIRP & BETSY LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL
POLICY AND THE LAW, 146-48 (West Publishing Co., 3d ed. 1992).
2'Id. at 296.
24 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
2
1Id.at 265 n.3.
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In subsequent cases, Christian student groups attempted to
extend the Widmar holding to gain the right to meet in public high
schools. After courts rejected a few of these attempts, 26 Congress
enacted the Equal Access Act, 27 which provides that if a public
secondary school which receives federal ftuds establishes a
"limited open forum" by permitting "noncuniculum related student
groups" to meet on its premises, it can not deny "equal access" to
other student groups on the basis of the: "religious, political,
28
philosophical or other content" of the speech at such meetings.
When the school authorities at Westside High School in Omaha
denied permission to a group of students to form a "Christian
Club," the students challenged the denial in federal court. 29 They
argued that their exclusion violated the Equal Access Act; their
adversaries argued that the Act was unconstitutional. 30 The
Supreme Court agreed with the Eighth Circuit and held for the
students, concluding that the Equal Access Act was constitutional
and that the school had violated it by denying the students access. 3 '
The Equal Access Act, and consequently the holding in
Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, applies only to public "secondary schools," i.e., high
schools (comprising the ninth to twelfth grades).32 Moreover,
since its holding was statutory, Mergens did not decide whether
younger student members of religious clubs, not covered by the
Equal Access Act, have a First Amendment right to meet on their
school's premises. The Supreme Court did not reenter this area of
First Amendment jurisprudence for a decade after it decided
Mergens.

26

See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D.

Pa. 1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v.
Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1155 (1983); Brandon v. Guilderland Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
27

20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2000).

20 U.S.C. § 407 1(a).
Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 232-33
(1990).
30
28

29

id.

31 Id. at 234

(affirming 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989)).
§ 407 1(a).

32 Id. at 250; 20 U.S.C.
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Meanwhile, in another "Good News" case from Missouri
with facts quite similar to the Milford, New York case, a younger
group of students who had formed a Christian religious group at
the Ladue Junior High School won a First Amendment victory in
court. 33 This group, the "Good News/Good Sports Club," which
included students between the ages of eleven to fifteen, had not
been totally excluded from the school. During the 1991-92 school
year, the Club had been permitted to meet at school once a month
from 3 to 3:55 p.m., which enabled them to take the late bus home
afterward.34 Following protests to the school board by residents
who complained about the religious content of the Club's
meetings, the board changed its policy to reserve the period from 3
to 6 p.m. for athletic activities and meetings of scout groups,
relegating the Club and other organizations to a period after 6
p.m. 35 The Club challenged the new policy in federal court.3 6 The
district court held for defendant school district but the Eighth
Circuit reversed, holding that the amended policy resulted in
"viewpoint discrimination" which did not serve a compelling
governmental37 interest and therefore violated the First
Amendment.
GOOD NEWS CLUB V. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL

The Milford, New York case 38 originated when Sharon
Fournier, wife of Steven Fournier, pastor of the Milford Center
Community Bible Church, organized a "Good News Club" for
children aged six to twelve at the Milford Central School. Pastor
Fournier was a "teacher" at the club, and the couple's daughter,
Andrea, was a Good News member. The Club originally met at
Pastor Fournier's church and members were transported there by
After the district ceased providing
school district buses.
33 Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of the City of Ladue, 28 F.3d

1501 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995).
34 Id. at 1502-3.
35
1Id. at 1503.
36 Id. The Club sought injunctive and declaratory relief based on its First
Amendment
rights.
37
1Id. at 1510.
38 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
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transportation in September, 1996, the Club formally requested to
use the school cafeteria from 3 to 4 p.m. for its weekly meetings.39
The state education law, which specifies uses to which
school buildings and facilities can be put, pemlits district residents
to use school premises for "instruction in any branch of education,
learning or the arts" and for "social, civil and recreational meetings
and entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare
of the community, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive
and shall be opened to the general public." 40 In addition, school
premises can be used for "meetings, entertainment and occasions
where admission fees are charged. . ." but not if the proceeds
benefit "a societV, association or organization of a religious sect or
denomination."4 Pursuant to §414, the local board of education
adopted a "Community Use Policy" which provided in pertinent
part that "School premises shall not be used by any individual or
organization for religious purposes. '42 The Club had requested use
of the Milford Central School cafeteria for "hearing a [B]ible
lesson and memorizing scripture," and Superintendent Robert
McGruder denied the Club's request on the grounds that this was
the equivalent of "religious worship.4 3
Plaintiffs accordingly brought an action in federal district
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge this denial. The court
preliminarily enjoined defendant school district from enforcing the
ban while the case was proceeding, but ilt eventually granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment."4 The district court's
justification for the exclusion of the Club from the Milford Central
School was premised on the finding that "its subject matter is
39 id.

40 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414(c) (McKinney 2000).
41 Id. § 414(d).
42 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. at 150. While § 41L4 did not expressly
prohibit access to public school property by student religious clubs. The New
York Appellate Division had held in a similar case that a. local school district
could not permit a student Bible club to meet on school property since religious
purposes were not included in § 414's list of permitted uses. Trietley v. Bd. Of
Educ. Of Buffalo, 65 A.D.2d 1, 5-6, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (4,h Dep't 1978);
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109 n.2. The Supreme Court's holding in Good
News
Club clearly renders Treitley a dead letter.
43
1Id.at 149.
44 Id. at 161.
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d cld~l~yrlgious in nature, and not merely a discussion of
secaulair'i iffeis from a religious perspective that is otherwise

permiitted under the District's use policies. 45
.
"rne case raised First Amendment "public forum" issues
concerning plaintiffs' rights of access to public property. The
exient to which people enjoy a First Amendment right of access to
public property varies depending on whether it is, for example, a
"traditional public forum" like streets and parks, which are
generally open to the public, 46 or a "nonpublic forum," which is

not.47 In Good News Club, the parties stipulated that Milford
Central School was neither of these but rather a "limited public
forum '4 8 which a state is not obliged to create, but, once it has
been created, must be open to the public on a non-discriminatory
basis. The Supreme Court has stated that a public forum may be
created for a limited purpose or for discussion of certain subjects;
when speech addresses a subject not encompassed in the purpose
of the forum, it may be excluded provided that the government

does not discriminate against it on the basis of viewpoint.49
After quoting at length from Good News lesson materials
and describing the program of the Club's meetings, which included
Bible readings, giving prizes for the memorization of Bible verses
and exhortations to accept Jesus as one's personal savior,50 the
41 Id. at

154.
46 See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). The Court stated:
[S]treets and parks... have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
4 E.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
800, 804 (1985) (finding that the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive
aimed at federal employees which resembles the Community Chest or United
fund, was not a traditional public forum, and a presidential Executive Order
excluding from the Campaign groups seeking to influence public policy through
advocacy, lobbying or litigation did not violate the groups' First Amendment
right to solicit charitable contributions).
8 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 15-17, and
Brief for Respondent at 26).
49 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983);
accord Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
50 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 154-57.
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district court concluded that the Good News meetings consisted of
"formal religious instruction and prayer to 'instill and reinforce
Christian faith' in the children.",5 Because the Milford Central
School had not permitted use of its facilities by similar religious
groups for religious instruction or prayer in the past, the court
concluded that exclusion of the Good New Club did not violate its
First Amendment rights.52
THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION.

On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Club argued that the
defendant school district had been guilty of unconstitutional

"viewpoint discrimination" and contended that while other groups,
such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts and 4-H Club were permitted
to teach moral values, it was prevented from doing so because it
sought to teach moral values from a Christian viewpoint. 53 The
court of appeals stated that if the Club was "merely.. .teaching..
.morals from a religious viewpoint," Milford's policy of excluding
it would not only not comply with § 414 of the State Education

Law but "would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination."5 4 It
stressed, however, that the Club's activities were not limited to
fostering "pure 'moral and character development;"' 55 instead, the
Club's Christian viewpoint contained the "additional layer" that its
56
moral exhortations were premised on a belief in Christ as Savior.
Thus, while school authorities would be obliged to permit
"discussion of secular subjects from a religious viewpoint, 5 7 lest
they be guilty of viewpoint discrimination by excluding such
discussion, exclusion of "discussion of religious material through
'9 was legitimate, since it was
religious instruction and prayer 58
based on the content or subject matter of the -speechrather than its
viewpoint, and the school had not previously opened its facilities, a
"
5 Id. at 154.
2 id.

" Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 509.
54 Id. n.8.
" Id. at 511.
7'Id. at 509.

1Id. at 510.

58

Good News Club, 202 F. 3d at 510.
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"limited public
forum," to outside groups for religious instruction
59
or prayer.
Needless to say, permitting "discussion of secular subjects
from a religious viewpoint," but forbidding "discussion of
religious material through religious instruction and prayer" is a
subtle distinction, and may be difficult to apply in practice. Judge
Jacobs, dissenting from the Second Circuit opinion, stated: "In my
view, when the subject matter is morals and character, it is quixotic
to attempt a distinction between religious viewpoints and religious
subject matters." 60 He further observed that "the sectarian religious
perspective will tend to look to the deity for answers to moral
questions. The idea that moral values take their shape and force
from God seems to me to be a viewpoint for the consideration of
moral questions."61
Judge Jacobs's point is illustrated by the following excerpt
from the deposition of Pastor Steven Fournier, which District
Judge Mc Avoy quoted in trying to answer the question "What is
the genre of Good News' activities?":
[B]ecause we are teaching morals from a Christian
perspective, we would present that perspective,
which is that these morals or these values are
senseless without Christ, that is to'the children who
know Christ as Savior, we would say; you know
you cannot be jealous because you know you have
the strength of God.' To the children Who do not
know Christ, we would say, you need Christ as your
Lord and Savior so that you might Overcome these,
you know, feelings of jealousy or overcome the
desire to do
bad things to those who have somehow
62
you.
hurt
Assuming, as seems reasonable, that Pastor Fournier is
accurately describing how hewould teach in a meeting of the Club,
this approach combines moral training (counseling children to
overcome feelings of jealousy and the desire for revenge) with
59Id. at 508; cf Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
60 Good News Club, 202 F.3d. at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
61Id. at

62

514.
Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 154-55.
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religious instruction (that Christ is the children's savior). Indeed,
"moral" and "religious" instruction are impossible to separate for
the devout children, whose strongest motive for moral behavior is
not a detached philosophical contemplation of the moral
superiority of overcoming jealousy and the desire for revenge, but
rather the commandment to love God and to love one's neighbor as
oneself,63 which obviously forbids jealousy and the desire for
revenge.
As noted above, the Second Circuit upheld the Club's
exclusion from Milford Central School because "the Club's
activities fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character
development. ' '64 The court thus implicitly set up a dichotomy
between moral training (secular in nature and permissible in the
public school forum) and religious instruction (sectarian and not
permitted there). Since religious faith is the wellspring of moral
principles for devout Christians, as illustrated by Pastor Fournier's
deposition statement, this dichotomy begs the question of the
nature of moral training and in doing so discriminates against the
Christian approach. Judge Jacobs's dissent imcisively recognized
this fact:
The school district allows use of its facilities by
certain groups that focus on "moral development"
of young people. The majority argues that the
activities of the Club are "quintessentially
religious", while the other groups deal only with the
"secular subject of morality." The fallac=y of this
distinction is that it treats morality as a subject that
is secular by nature, which of course; it may be or
6

3Jesus affirmed this commandment in a colloquy with a lawyer in the passage

preceding the "Good Samaritan" parable in Luke's Gospel:
And behold, a lawyer stood up to put him to the test, saying,
"Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?"' He said to
him, "What is written in the law? How do you read?" And he
answered, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your
heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and
with all your mind: and your neighbor as yourself." And he
said to him, "You have answered right; do 1his, and you will
live."
Luke 10:25-28.
"Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 511 (emphasis added).
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not, depending on one's point of view. Discussion
of morals and character from purely secular
viewpoints of idealism, culture or general uplift will
often appear secular, while discussion of the same
issues from a religious viewpoint will often appear
65
essentially - quintessentially - religious ....
Thus, the majority's privileging of secular ways of teaching
morality appears arbitrary and has a discriminatory impact on
groups like the Good News Club, which will lose their right to
participate in a public forum unless they fundamentally alter their
approach to moral teaching by cutting out its core of Christian
faith.
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and ruled
for the Club in an opinion written by Justice Thomas and joined by
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy and by Justice
Breyer in part. 66 The majority ruled that Milford Central School
had violated the Club's free speech rights by engaging in
"viewpoint discrimination" 67 when it excluded the Club from
meeting in the school building, and it further held that this
violation was not justified in any way by the Establishment
Clause. 68 Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize
that alleged peer pressure on students to participate in the Club's
activities could not be considered coercion, and that there was no
possibility of state "endorsement" of the Club's activities under the
facts of the case. 69 Justice Breyer concurred in part, but he would
have remanded the case for further findings of fact.7 ° Justices
Stevens 7' and Souter 72 dissented on Establishment Clause grounds,
and Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's opinion.
202 F.3d at 515 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
66
Good News Club, 533 U.S at 101-02.
67
Id. at 109.
68 Id. at 102.
69 Id. at 120-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70 Id.
at 127-30 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
News Club, 533 U.S at 130-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7'
72 Good
Id. at 134-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65
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After the standard recitation of public forum law, Justice
Thomas raised the question of whether the Ci[ub's exclusion
constituted viewpoint discrimination and answered it affirmatively.
He invoked Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,73 which had not even been cited by the: Second Circuit. In
Lamb's Chapel, which also involved § 414 of the New York State
Education Law, a school district denied the applications by an
evangelical Christian church to use its facilities: 1) to conduct
Sunday morning services; and 2) to show "a family orientated
movie from a Christian perspective" in the evening for five
consecutive weeks. 74 A long list of mostly secular community
organizations had been granted permission to meet on school
property, but the defendant school district's Rule 7, promulgated
under the authority of § 414, provided that school premises "shall
not be used by any group for religious purposes."" Noting that
child rearing, the subject of the proposed film series, was a
permissible subject under the school district's rules and that
exhibition of the film series was denied "solely because the series
dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint, ' 76 the Court
concluded that the denial was not "viewpoint neutral", as required
in nonpublic forums,77 but
instead constituted unconstitutional
78
discrimination.
viewpoint
According to Justice Thomas, the parallels between Lamb's
Chapel and Good News Club were striking: both groups had
attempted to address, from a religious standpoint, the teaching of
morals and character, which were subjects otherwise permitted
under the school district's rules, while the only difference between
the two was the inconsequential one that Good News used live
storytelling and prayer, while Lamb's Chapel taught lessons
through film. 79 Both groups manifested a religious viewpoint, so
"the exclusion of the Good News Club's activities, like the
7'508 U.S.

at 384.
Id.at 387.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 394.
74

Id. at 392-93 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, and Perry Educ. Ass'., 460
U.S.
78 at 49).
17

79

Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at394.
Good News Club, 533 U.S. 109-10.
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exclusion of Lamb's Chapel's
films, constitutes unconstitutional
'' 0
viewpoint discrimination.
Justice Thomas also stated that Good News Club was
governed by Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia.81 In Rosenberger, the university had established a
"Student Activities Fund," with money from mandatory student
fees, with which it paid printing costs of publications issued by
student groups. However, the university had withheld this printing
subsidy from Wide Awake Productions, a student group, for the
sole reason that it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality, ' 82 which was
prohibited by the University's Student Activity Fund Guidelines.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that
this constituted viewpoint discrimination and thus violated Wide
Awake's free speech rights, and that it was not justified by the
University's need to comply with the Establishment Clause, since
the Fund established a neutral government program, whose
neutrality was not compromised by the fact that religious

Id. at 110. Justice Thomas sharply chastised Judge Miner of the Second
Circuit for ignoring Lamb's Chapel in his opinion for the majority: "We find it
remarkable that the Court of Appeals majority did not cite Lamb's Chapel,
despite its obvious relevance to the case. We do not necessarily expect a court
of appeals to catalog every opinion that reverses one of its precedents.
Nonetheless, this oversight is particularly incredible because the majority's
80

attention was directed to it at every turn.. ." Id. at 109 n.3. It appears that the

Second Circuit, unhappy with the increasing divergence between itself and the
Supreme Court majority on Establishment Clause issues, was recalcitrantly
sticking to its own arguably inconsistent line of cases, including Deeper Life
ChristianFellowship v. Board of Education, 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988), Bronx
Household of Faith v. Community School District No. 10, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir.
1997), and Full Gospel Tabernacle v. Community School District 27, 164 F.3d
829 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036 (1999). As noted below, Justice
Thomas did not explicitly distinguish any of these, although he initially cited
Bronx Household of Faith in identifying the "conflict among the Courts of
Appeals on the question whether speech can be excluded from a limited public
forum on the basis of the religious nature of the speech." Good News Club, 533
U.S. at 105. The Good News Club decision clearly casts considerable doubt on
the continued validity of all three prior Second Circuit cases.
"' 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110.
8
2Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 825.
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publications were eligible for the subsidy oil the same terms as
secular publications.
The Wide Awake publication "challenged Christians to
live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and...
encouraged students to consider what a personal relationship with
Jesus Christ means. ' ' 4 While the University Guidelines did not
prohibit religion as a subject matter, they "selected for disfavored
treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial
viewpoints," 85 and the Court therefore held that the denial of
funding to print Wide Awake was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. 86 The Second Circuit, of cou'se, had held that the
Good News Club's activities - focused on teaching children how
to cultivate a relationship with God through Jesus Christ - fell
"outside the bound of pure 'moral and character development"'
and therefore the
Club's exclusion did not constitute viewpoint
87
discrimination.
Use of the word "pure" here was a mistake for the Second
Circuit, just as its failure to even mention the Supreme Court's
Lamb's Chapel decision was a mistake. Justice Thomas reacted
with vigor:
We disagree that something that is "quintessentially
religious" or "decidedly religious in nature" cannot
also be characterized properly as the teaching of
morals and character development from a,
particular
88
viewpoint.
He quoted with approval dissenting Judge Jacobs's statement that
"When the subject matter is morals and character, it is quixotic to
attempt a distinction between religious viewpoints and religious
subject matters."8 9 Moreover, Thomas zeroed in on what seemed
like discrimination on the part of the Second Circuit panel against
religious speech:

83

Id. at 832, 837, 839, 842.

" Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826).
5Id. (citing Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 831).
6Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
87 See supra, notes 55-59.
88 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111.
89 Id. (citing 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
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It is apparent that the unstated principle of the Court
of Appeals' reasoning is its conclusion that any time
religious instruction and prayer are used to discuss
morals and character, the discussion is simply not a
"pure" discussion of those issues. According to the
Court of Appeals, reliance on Christian principles
taints moral and character instruction in a way that
other foundations for thought or viewpoints do not.
We, however, have never reached such a
conclusion. Instead, we reaffirm our holdings in
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger that speech
discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be
excluded from a limited public forum on the ground
that the subject is discussed from a religious
viewpoint.
Thus, we conclude that Milford's
exclusion of the Club from use of the school,
pursuant to its community use policy,90constitutes
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
Justice Thomas next addressed Milford Central School's
arguments that exclusion of the Club was necessary in order for the
school to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. 91 While he left
open the possibility that a state interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation, which can be "compelling," might
justify content-based discrimination, he said that it was unclear
whether it could justify viewpoint discrimination. 92 In any event,
the Court determined that the issue did not need to be addressed in
this case, "because we conclude that the school has no valid
Establishment Clause interest. 93
Thomas likened this case to both Lamb's Chapel and
Widmar, free speech cases in which the Supreme Court had
rejected Establishment Clause arguments against permitting
religious groups to meet on public school premises:
The Establishment Clause defense fares no better in
this case. As in Lamb's Chapel, the Club's
90 Id. at 111- 12.
91 Id.
at 112.
921d. at 112-13.
9'Good News Club, 533 U.S at 113.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss1/9

16

Schweitzer: Good News Club

GOOD NEWS CLUB

2001

meetings were held after school hours, not
sponsored by the school, and open to any student
who obtained parental consent, not just to Club
members. As in Widmar, Milford made its forum
available to other organizations.
The Club's
activities are materially indistinguishable from
those in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. Thus,
Milford's reliance
on the Establishment Clause in
94
unavailing.
Finally, Thomas addressed Milford's argument that the
elementary school children involved would perceive that the
school was endorsing the Club and would feel coercive pressure to
participate because meetings took place on school grounds, even
though they occurred after school hours. 95 lie gave five reasons
why this argument was "unpersuasive": governmental neutrality;
the requirement of parental consent; the fact that the Club's
activities took place during non-school hours; the fact that the
circumstances did not give rise to an impression of endorsement;
and the fact that it was equally likely that school children would
perceive a hostility to the religious viewpoint 'if
the Club were
excluded as that they would "misperceive"
endorsement
if the
96
school.
in
meet
to
allowed
were
Club
First, Thomas asserted that government "neutrality" in
distributing aid or making access available to diverse groups was 97a
strong defense against claims of Establishment Clause violations.
As the Court had stated in Rosenberger, the "guarantee of
neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government,
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends
benefits to recipients whose ideologies
and viewpoints, including
98
religious ones, are broad and diverse."
Second, as far as the danger of "coercive pressure" of the
community to take part in the Club's activities is concerned, "the
relevant community would be the parents, not the elementary
94Id.
IId. at 113-14.
96
Id.at 114-19.
97

Id. at 114.

9' Good News Club, 533 U.S at 114 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839).
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school children," 99 since parental permission was required for
children to attend the Club's meetings. For this reason, the
children could not be coerced into participating in the Club's
°°
religious activities.' 100
Third, Thomas confronted the suggestion that elementary
school children are "more impressionable" than older children and
therefore more likely to perceive that Milford would be endorsing
the Club if it permitted it to meet on school premises.101 Thomas
stated that whatever weight the Court had given the factor in the
past, "we have never extended our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to foreclose private religious conduct during
nonschool hours merely because it takes place on school premises
where elementary school children may be present."' 10 2 He
distinguished the graduation prayer case, Lee v. Weisman, 10 3 on the
grounds that attendance was obligatory for students,1 0 4 and the
football prayer case, Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, 10 5 6 because that prayer took place at a school-sponsored
10

event.

Milford had also cited Edwards v. Aguillard,'°7 in which
the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana law forbidding the
teaching of evolution as part of the public school curriculum unless
accompanied by a lesson on creationism because it served no
secular purpose and was intended to endorse a religious viewpoint,
in violation of the Establishment Clause. Thus, the law's fatal flaw
was that the state government was taking control of the public
school curriculum to promote beliefs based on religion. 0 8 The
Court mentioned in Edwards that students were susceptible to
99Id. at 115.
10o Id.

101 Id.
102 id.
103 505 U.S. at 586-87. In Lee, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for a
public school district to invite a rabbi to offer an invocation and a benediction at
a middle school commencement ceremony and to provide him with guidelines
concerning the prayers' content.
'o4 Good News Club, 533 U.S at 115.
'os 530 U.S. at 301 (holding that the school's policy of "permitting student-led,
student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause").
'06 GoodNews Club, 533 U.S at 115-16.
107 482 U.S. 578 (1987).

o8 Id. at 582.
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pressure in the classroom.' 0 9 In addition, Milford had cited Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education," where the Court
invalidated a school district program which excused public school
children from their regular class during the school day to attend
classes taught by clergymen, and Schempp,11 1 in which the court
found unconstitutional the reading of Bible verses in Pennsylvania
public schools at the beginning of each school-day. Thomas
distinguished all these cases on the grounds that unlike Good News
Club, they involved activities during the regular school day." 2
Fourth, Thomas maintained that the facts of Good News
Club did not support an inference of school endorsement of the
Club's activities. The meetings were held not in elementary school
classrooms but in a combined high school and middle school
resource room. " 3 The instructors were not school teachers. It was
not clear that "young children are permitted to loiter outside
classrooms after the schoolday has ended," and they must
understand the significance of requiring parental permission
it unlikely
forms." 4 All these factors, according to Thomas, made
1 5
that small children would perceive endorsement here. 1
Fifth, Thomas turned the endorsement argument against the
defendant school district by emphasizing the opposite danger:
Finally, even if we were to inquire into the minds of
schoolchildren in this case, we cannot say the
danger that children would misperceive the
endorsement of religion is any greater than the
danger that they would perceive a hostility toward
the religious viewpointl 6if the Club were excluded
from the public forum."
The latter danger was exacerbated by the fact that the school also
contained older students through the twelfth grade, and members
of the public were permitted to use the building after hours; these
109 Id. at 583-84.
"0

333 U.S. at 212.
1..
374 U.S. at 223.
112

Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115-17.

3

. Id. at 118.

114 Id. at 117-18.
115

Id. at 117-20.

116

Id. at 118.
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groups might learn of the Club's exclusion "and could suffer as
much from viewpoint discrimination as elementary school children
could suffer from perceived endorsement." 11 7 Thus, the risk that
school children could. "misperceive" endorsement did not warrant
restricting the Club's freedom of speech:
We cannot operate, as Milford would have us do,
under the assumption that any risk that small
children would perceive endorsement should
counsel in favor of excluding the Club's religious
activity. We decline to employ Establishment
Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler's
veto, in which a group's religious activity can be
proscribed on the basis of what the youngest
member of the audience might misperceive. 118
Since there was no obvious significance to the fact that
elementary school children might witness the Club's activities on
school premises, the Court concluded that "permitting the Club to
meet on the school's premises would not have violated the
Establishment Clause."' ' 9Therefore, it held as follows:
When Milford denied the Good News Club access
to the school's limited public forum on the ground
that the Club was religious in nature, it
discriminated against the Club because of its
religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. Because Milford
has not raised a valid Establishment Clause claim,
we do not address the question whether such a
claim
could 120 excuse
Milford's
viewpoint
discrimination.
The Second Circuit decision was reversed and remanded.
Good News Club, 533 U.S at 118.
"Id. at 119.
"1

119 Id.
120

Id. at 120. Needless to say, the plain import of the Court's holding is that

Milford's "Community Use Policy," prohibiting use of school property "by any

individual or organization for religious purposes," Good News Club, 21 F. Supp.
at 150, is unconstitutional.
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JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE

Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion, but he wrote a
concurring opinion emphasizing why he thought the Establishment
Clause issue in Good News Club was. not even close. For
constitutional purposes, he believed that the extent of "coercive
pressure" on the students was "zero." 121 As for "peer pressure" of
students on one another, the "compulsion of ideas" rather than
"coercion" was at work, and such activities, if private, comprise
"one of the attendant consequences of a freedom of association that
is constitutionally protected."' 122 "The private right to exert and
receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is
'protected' by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. . .", and
123
"A priest has as much liberty to proselytize as a patriot.,
Quoting his own opinion for the Court in.
Capitol Square
1
24
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, Scaltia asserted that
"religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause
where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or
designated public forum, publicly announced. and open to all on
equal terms." 125 He stated that that is also true where, as in Good
News Club, "private speech.. .occurs in a limited public forum,
publicly announced, whose boundaries are not drawn to favor
126
religious groups but instead permit a cross-section of uses."
Under these circumstances, he contended, it made no difference
whether the Club's exclusion was characterized as viewpoint or
subject-matter discrimination, since there was no legitimate reason
whatever under
the Establishment Clause to exclude the Club from
127
school.
the
Scalia identified the crux of the dissenters' disagreement
with the Court as their belief that it was proper to exclude such
"purely religious" speech by the Club as urging children "who
already believe in the Lord Jesus as their Savior" to "stop and ask
121 Id. at 120-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'2

Good News Club, 533 U.S at 121.

124

515 U.S. 753 (1995).

13 Id. (emphasis in original).

'2 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 121 (quoting Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770).
126 Id.
27
' Id. at 122.
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God for the strength and the 'want'.. .to obey Him," and inviting
children who "don't know Jesus as Savior" to "trust the Lord Jesus
to be their Savior from sin."' 128 He asserted that the dissenters
believed that such speech could be legitimately excluded from the
school without viewpoint discrimination, but he disagreed with this
view.
Scalia noted that the defendant school had opened its
facilities to any "use pertaining to the welfare of the community..
•," including "shaping the moral and character development of
children."' 129 Thus, the Boy Scouts of America could endeavor to
instill character in boys for secular reasons, and a group could use
Aesop's Fables to teach moral values. 130 It was only when a group
like Good News engaged in character training based on its faith in
God that access was denied.13 ' Scalia eloquently argued that the
dissenters' approach would justify viewpoint discrimination
because only religious speakers' basic premises underlying their
morality were ruled out of bounds. He stated:
From no other group does respondent require the
sterility of speech that it demands of petitioners.
The Boy Scouts could undoubtedly buttress their
exhortations to keep "morally straight" and live
"clean" lives. . .by giving reasons why that is a
good idea - because parents want and expect it,
because it will make the scouts "better" and "more
successful" people, because it will emulate such
admired past Scouts as former President Gerald
Ford. The Club, however, may only discuss morals
and character, and cannot give its reasons why they
should be fostered - because God wants and expects
it, because it will make the Club members "saintly"
people, and because it emulates Jesus Christ. The
Club may not, in other words, independently
discuss the religious premise on which its views are
based - that God exists and His assistance is
necessary to morality. It may not defend the
21 Id.at
29

1

123.

1Id. at 123-24.
Club, 533 U.S. at 124.
id.

130 Good News
31
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149

premise, and it absolutely must not seek to persuade
the children that the premise is true. The children
must, so to say, take it on faith. This is blatant
viewpoint discrimination. Just as calls to character
based on patriotism will go unanswered if the
listeners do not believe their country is good and
just, calls to moral behavior based on God's will are
useless if the listeners do not believe that God
exists. Effectiveness in presenting a viewpoint rests
on the persuasiveness with which the speaker
defends his premise - and in respondent's facilities
every premise
but a religious one may be
32
defended.

Scalia further noted that it was the same kind of "viewpoint
restriction" which the Court had struck down in Rosenberger, in
which the private student newspaper which had been denied a
subsidy said that its mission was "to encourage students to
consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means" 133
and its mission further stated: "[t]he only way to salvation through
Him is by confessing and repenting of sin. It is the Christian's
duty to make sinners aware of their need for salvation." 34 He
stated that Justice Souter would justify exclusion of the Club
because its meetings were essentially "an evangelical service of
worship" 135 but claimed that the Court in Widmar had held that the
distinction between worship and other religious speech
was neither
36
intelligible nor relevant to the constitutional issue.'
JUSTICE BREYER'S OPINION

Justice Breyer "concurred in part" with the Court's
decision.137 He emphasized that government neutrality is only one
132 Id. at 124-25 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
113 Id. at 125 (quoting Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 826).
134 Id. (quoting Rosenberger 515 U.S. at 865 (Souteir, J., dissenting) (quoting

the student paper)).
135 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 126.
36
' Id. (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269, n. 6).
37 Id. at 127-30 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
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of the factors relevant to determining whether there is an
Establishment Clause violation, and the critical Establishment
Clause question here might be "whether a child, participating in
the Good New Club's activities, could reasonably perceive the
school's permission for the club to use its facilities as an
endorsement of religion.'' 38 Moreover, he suggested that given the
case's procedural posture, the Court could not fully answer the
Establishment Clause questions the case raised; he noted that the
factual record was incomplete and that the Court had made
assumptions about other facts. 13 9 Consequently, he, argued, it
would be appropriate for both parties to have an opportunity
on
1 40
remand to adduce further evidence, should they so desire.
JUSTICE STEVENS'S DISSENT

Justice Stevens, while conceding that the case was
"undoubtedly close,"' 4 ' dissented. 42 He said that speech for
"religious purposes," which was precluded from public schools by
Section 414 of the New York Education Law, could be divided
into three categories: 1) "speech about a particular topic from a
religious point of view," 2) worship, and 3) proselytizing.1 43 He
acknowledged that "[a] public entity may not generally exclude
even religious worship from an open public forum,' ' 14a but insisted
that it had broad discretion to preserve public property for its
intended use, i.e., to maintain a "limited public forum.' ' 145 Milford,
he noted, did not intend to exclude all speech in the first category,
but merely speech constituting worship and proselytizing speech,
which if permitted might foster divisiveness and might "tend to
separate young children into cliques that undermine the school's
educational mission."' 4 6 Stevens saw nothing unconstitutional in
excluding the second and third categories from the Milford schools
131
Id.at 127-28 (emphasis added).
39
1 Id. at 128-29.
140
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 129.

141
Id. at 134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141
Id. at 130-34.
"'Id. at 130-31.

'4Id. at 130.
141
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130 (citing cases which have so held).
46Id. at 131-32
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while permitting the first category, 147 to which the film in Lamb's
Chapel and
the Christian student newspaper in Rosenberger
148
belonged.
JUSTICE SOUTER'S DISSENT

Justice Souter's dissent, which Justice Ginsburg joined,
contended that it was error for the Court to reach the Establishment
Clause issue, which he said the lower courts had not even
addressed. 149 Souter stated that the Club had not objected to the
reasonableness of Milford's policy prohibiting use of its facilities
for religious purposes, so in his view the sole issue for the
Supreme Court was whether Milford had misapplied its policy in a
way that would amount to imposing a viewpoint-based restriction
on speech in its forum. 50 He answered that question in the
negative.
Souter premised the principal part of his dissent on "the
accepted rule that a government body may designate a public
forum subject to a reasonable limitation on the scope of permitted
subject matter and activity, so long as the government does not use
the forum-defining restrictions to deny expression to a particular
viewpoint on subjects open to discussion."' 51 He quoted several
excerpts from a sample Good News lesson to show that the Club
engaged in prayer and that it invited and encouraged children to
recognize Jesus as their savior. 152 He stated that while the majority
had blandly characterized the Club's activity as "teaching of
morals and character, from a religious standpoint," 153 they failed
to acknowledge that it was more than that and in fact constituted a
Christian worship service:
It is beyond question that Good News intends to use
the public school premises not for the mere
discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian
14 Id. at

133.

148 Id. n. 3.
14 9 ,d. at 135

(Souter, J., dissenting).

150 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 136.
"'

Id. at 135.

152 Id. at

137-38.

5 Id. at 139 (internal citiations omitted).
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point of view, but for an evangelical service of
worship calling children to commit themselves in an
act of Christian conversion. 154
He further agreed with Justice Stevens that "Good News's
activities may be characterized as proselytizing and therefore as
outside the purpose of Milford's limited forum.' 5
Accordingly, Souter argued that the lower courts had
correctly concluded that "the undisputed facts in this case differ
from those in Lamb's Chapel, as night from day. 15 6 In Lamb's
Chapel, the Court had unanimously held it unconstitutional for a
school to "permit school property to be used for the presentation of
all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing
with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.' 5 7 That case
involved plainly unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination; Souter
clearly believed that in contrast, Milford in Good News had
excluded from school premises not speech from a religious
viewpoint but rather
the entire subject matter areas of worship and
58
proselytizing.'
The case had been litigated in the lower courts principally
on the limited public forum issues, and Milford only raised its
claim that granting Good News's application would violate the
Establishment Clause to demonstrate that it had a compelling
interest in denying the application. 5 9 Accordingly, Souter
contended that it was error for the Court even to decide the
Establishment Clause issues, and that this was "in derogation of
this Court's proper role as a court of review." 160 He regarded this
as usurpation of the trial court's fact-finding role and favored a
remand on all other issues in the case to determine such facts as
whether Good News conducts its instruction at the
same time as school-sponsored extracurricular and
athletic activities conducted by school staff and
volunteers; whether any other community groups
54
'
151

Id. at 138.

Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 138 n. 3 (citing Justice Steven's dissent)

(internal
citations omitted).
56

Id. at 137.
1 Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 393-94.
"I Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 138, 138 n.3.
15 9 Id. at 139.
1

160 Id.
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use school facilities immediately after classes end
and how many students participate in those groups;
and the extent to which Good News, with 28
students in its membership, may "dominate the
forum" in a way that6 1heightens the perception of
official endorsement.'

Nevertheless, while disclaiming the ability to decide the
Establishment Clause issues on the basis of such an incomplete set
of facts, Souter asserted that even the incomplete record in the case
1 62
contained disturbing hints of an Establishment Clause violation.
While the majority had relied on Lamb's Chapel and Widmar,
whose facts it deemed "materially indistinguishable" 163 from the
facts in Good News Club, Souter found an absence of similar facts
in the Good News Club record. 64 The Court in Widmar had
emphasized that the case involved young adults who were less
impressionable than younger students, and that the access granted
to the same university facilities for numerous other groups negated
any inference of official endorsement of the student religious
group.165 Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel, the school property had
repeatedly been used by a wide variety' of other private
organizations, and the program in question, was addressed to
adults.1 66 In contrast, Good News involved schoolchildren, whose
impressionability the Court had often recognized. 167 Only four
161
162
163
'64
165
'6

167

Id. at 140 (citations omitted).
Id. at 140-41.
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 141 (citing majority opinion).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274, n. 14.).
Id. at 142 (citing Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395).
Id. at 142-43. Justice Souter emphasized this factor in distinguishing Good

News Club from Widmar and Lamb's Chapel:
The cohort addressed by Good News is not university
students with relative maturity, or even high school pupils, but
elementary school children as young as six.
The
Establishment Clause cases have consistently recognized the
particular impressionability of schoolchildren see Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987), and the special
protection required for those in the elementary grades in the
school forum, see County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
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other outside groups had met in the school, and the Club's
meetings uniquely began immediately after the school day

ended.' 68 Thus, even on this limited record, Souter concluded that
there is a good case that Good News's exercises
blur the line between public classroom instruction
and private religious indoctrination, leaving a
reasonable elementary school pupil unable to
appreciate that the former instruction is the business
of the school while the latter evangelism is not.

Thus, the facts we know (or think we know) point
away from the majority's conclusion.... 169
ANALYSIS

Since both parties stipulated that Milford had created a
limited public forum when it opened its facilities in 1992,170 the
first question addressed by Justice Thomas was whether the Club's
free speech rights had been violated. 17 1 The second question was

whether any such violation was justified by Milford's concern that
permitting the club to meet in its building would violate the
Establishment Clause. 172 One cannot fully appreciate or evaluate
the significant legal issues posed by the case without referring to
the history of officially sponsored religious exercises in American

public schools.

620, n. 69 (1989). We have held the difference between
college students and grade school pupils to be a "distinction
[that] warrants a difference in constitutional results," Edwards
v. Aguillard, supra, at 584, n. 5 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
'6 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 144.
' 69 Id. at 144-45.
170 The Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel had declined to decide whether a
school district's opening of its facilities pursuant to N.Y. Educ. Law § 414
created a limited or a traditional public forum. 508 U.S. at 391-92; Good News
Club, 533 U.S. at 106. Because of the parties' agreement that Milford had
created a limited public forum, the Court simply assumed that this was the case.
See supranote 48.
171 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107.
172 Id. at 112.
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There is a long history of religious exercises and influences
in American public education which is repugnant to the

contemporary understanding of the principle of separation of
church and state. For many years, such exerc:ises,, which included
official prayers and Bible reading, placed pupils who were
members of minority religions in difficult dilemmas of conscience
in which they either had to participate in prayers and other
activities which were antithetical or offensive to their own
religious beliefs, or else remain silent or ask to be excused and
thereby risk ostracism by their peers. A series of cases brought by
religious minority students sensitized the Supreme Court to these
dilemmas and impelled it to require public school religious
neutrality in order to preserve separation of church and state and to
protect such students from being placed in such dilemmas.
In the midst of the emotional hyper-nationadism engendered
by World War II, the Supreme Court in 1940 in Minersville School
Districtv. Gobitis173 upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania
statute requiring schoolchildren to salute the American flag; two
Jehovah's Witnesses children, whose religion deemed the salute
idolatry, had sued after they were expelled friom school for
refusing to salute the flag.' 7 4 Only three years later, the Court in
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette17 recoiled from the
short shrift it had given to the rights of conscience of public school
students in Gobitis and overruled the decision. 176 Ever since then,
the Court has empathized with the dilemmas faced by children
whose religious beliefs are violated by official school precepts or
practices. In Barnette, the choice faced by Jehovah's Witnesses
students who believed the flag salute to be: idolatry was stark:
either comply or be expelled." 7 The dilemma of the Unitarian
children of the named plaintiff in Abington School District v.

'73 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
'74 Id. at 591.

'"319 U.S. 624 (1943).

'76ld. at 642.
177 Id. at 630

("Parents of such children have been prosecuted and are

threatened with prosecutions for causing delinquency.").

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001

29

Touro Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 [2001], Art. 9

TOURO LAW REVIEW

156

[Vol 18

Schempp 178 was less harsh: their father testified that while the
family, as Unitarians, objected to the public school's program of
Bible reading, he directed his children not to exercise their right to
leave the room lest they be considered to be "oddballs" by their
peers. 179 Nevertheless, Schempp and Engel'80 firmly established
the principle that the Establishment Clause outlawed official
prayers and Bible reading in public schools.
American public school history is full of incidents in which
official practices have violated students' consciences.
The
Catholics in New York City established their parochial school
system in the 1830's largely because the "public" schools
8
explicitly taught a form of non-denominational Protestantism,' 1
and Catholic students were punished for refusing, at the direction
of their priests, to recite passages from the Protestant King James
Version of the Bible in school. 182 Until recent times, public
schools in various Southern states have conducted Bible study
classes with a Protestant viewpoint, although Catholic and Jewish
children were 83
ordinarily permitted to leave the classroom during
periods.1
these
178374

U.S. at 203.
1 Id. at 208, 208 n.3.
10370 U.S. at 421; see supra note 15.
79

181See DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS, NEW YORK CITY, 1805-

1973, ch. 4 (1974); MICHAEL S. ARiENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY INA PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 148-50 (Carolina Academic Press, 1996).
182

E.g. Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854) (upholding expulsion from

public school of Bridget Donahoe who, following the urging of a Jesuit priest,
refused to read from the Protestant King James Bible as directed by the local
school committee; the Jesuit was later tarred and feathered by townspeople);
Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417, 419 (Police Court, Boston, Mass.

1859) (teacher who beat Catholic boy repeatedly on the hands for a half hour
"with a rattan stick, some three feet in length, and three-eights of an inch thick"
for his refusal to recite from the King James Bible exonerated). The court held
that the required reading of the Bible "is no interference with religious liberty",
id. at 423, and to permit substitution of the (Catholic) Douay Version would
violate the Massachusetts Constitution, which required "neutrality" among
religious sects. Id. at 424-45; see also Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 443 (1876)
(upholding expulsion of Catholic students for being absent from school to attend
mass on a Catholic holy day).
183 Despite their obvious unconstitutionality, such practices persist. In a recent
case, the Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., challenged the "Bible
Education Ministry" in the public schools of Rhea County, Tennessee. Doe v.
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Religious indoctrination in public schools, moreover, was
not limited to practices mandated by government and school
administrators. In numerous recent instances, teachers have
violated the requirement of institutional neutrality and tried to
impose their own religious views on their students. An earlier case
involving a chapter of the Good News Club in Reynoldsburg, Ohio
furnished an example of this.84 The Reynoldsburg Club was
founded in the 1970s by Roberta Penwell, a teacher at Herbert
Mills Elementary School, and met weekly at 3:30 p.m. on school
property immediately after classes ended. After the School Board
decided to require the Club to meet at 6:30 p.m. instead of 3:45
p.m., some of the fifth and sixth grade members of the Club and
their parents sued the superintendent in federal district court.18 5
The court found:
In her capacity as a teacher, and during her
regularly scheduled classes, Mrs. Penwell has also
recited prayers on special occasions, permitted a
moment of silence after the pledge of allegiance,
allowed religious material to be placed on a table in
the classroom, displayed religious sayings on her
Porter, 188 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Tenn. 2002). In 1925, the Rhea County
Courthouse was the site of the famous "Monkey" trial, in which high school
teacher John Scopes was tried for violating the Tennessee :statute criminalizing
the teaching of "evolution theory" in the public schools. Scope's attorney, the
renowned Clarence Darrow, was pitted against William Jennings Bryan, an
evangelical, former presidential candidate, who represented the state. During
the trial, Bryan expressed the wish that a school might be established in Dayton,
the county seat of Rhea County, "to teach the truth from a Biblical perspective,"
and Bryan College was subsequently founded. Id. at 906. Under the "Bible
Education Ministry," Bryan College undergraduates instructed public school
pupils from kindergarten through grade five in the Bible and Christian doctrine
for thirty minutes each week during regular school hours. Id. at 907. The pupils
sang songs like Jesus Loves Me," and the Bible was taught as religious truth.
Parental consent was never obtained for pupils to participate, and there was no
evidence that any child had ever opted out. Id. The court held the program
unconstitutional under Illinois el rel. McCollum. Id. at 91.1. See also, Doe v.
Human, 725 F. Supp. 1503 (W.D. Ark. 1989), aff'd, 725 F.2d 857 (8t' Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991); Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp.
1422 (W.D. Va. 1983); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133, (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
's4 Quappe v. Endry, 772 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd, 979 F. 2d 851
(6th Cir. 1992).
'

Id. at 1007.
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wall, distributed bibles to her class,
and invited
86
1
meetings.
Club
attend
students to
Moreover, while seven other adults, none of whom were school
employees, assisted Mrs. Penwell in leading Club meetings, Mrs.
Penwell greeted children at the Club meetings, took attendance and
distributed materials for class projects.18 7 In response to these
improper and probably unconstitutional actions, the school
admonished Mrs. Penwell in writing that her employment would
be jeopardized if she persisted in such behavior. In addition, to
avoid the appearance of school sponsorship of the Club,
Superintendent Endry directed
that the Club's meeting time be
88
p.m.1
7:30
until
postponed
A teacher in a recent Texas public school case also grossly
overstepped the bounds of propriety and indeed constitutionality
when he promoted his religion and attacked another religion in
class. 189 The parties' stipulated facts revealed that
in April 1993, while plaintiff Jane Doe II was
attending her seventh grade Texas History class, her
teacher, David Wilson, handed out fliers advertising
a Baptist religious revival. Jane Doe II asked if
non-Baptists were invited to attend, prompting
Wilson to inquire about her religious affiliation. On
hearing that she was an adherent of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormon), Wilson
launched into a diatribe about the non-Christian,
cult-like nature of Mormonism, and its general
evils.
Wilson's comments inspired further
discussion among Jane Doe 11's classmates, some of
whom reportedly noted that "[h]e sure does make it
16

1

rId. at 1006-07.

187 Id. at

1006.
1007. When the club appealed the time change to the School Board,
the board changed it to 6:30 p.m. When Club members challenged the 6:30 p.m.
time in federal district court as a violation of various First Amendment rights,
188Id. at

however, the court ruled against them and granted summary judgment to

defendant superintendent of schools. Id. at 1016.
189 Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5" Cir. 1999), affid, 530
U.S. 290 (2000). The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' conclusion that

student-led prayers at public high school football games violate the
establishment clause.
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sound evil," and "[g]ee,.

.

. it's kind of like the

KKK, isn't it?" Jane Doe II was understandably

190
upset by this incident ....
After Jane Doe II's mother complained to the school district

authorities about Wilson's actions, which violated the district's
policies barring the distribution of religious literature in class,
Wilson was given a written reprimand
and was directed to
191
apologize to the Does and to his class.
These two cases illustrate the penchant of some public

school teachers to violate students' rights to religious neutrality in
the classroom both by promoting their own denomination and by
attacking others. Plainly, the fear that young impressionable pupils
will be exposed to improper sectarian influences fIom teachers and
others in their schools is not chimerical. In light of the fact that
compulsory attendance laws make students
a captive audience, the
1 92
abuses.
such
against
guard
must
courts
In summary, American history provides numerous
examples of cases in which students in public schools have been
exposed to religious influences and even subjected to religious
coercion that violated their religious beliefs and rights of
conscience. Not only the First Amendment, but basic decency
requires that the state, which compels them to attend school, must
90

Doe, 168 F.3d at 810.
191 Id. For another example of public school teacher participation in prayer
meetings on school premises, see Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d
1391 (10d'Cir. 1985).
192 This point was made by Justice Brennan in the passage from the Edwards
opinion cited by Justice Souter in Good News Club:
The court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and
secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the
education of their children, but condition their trust on the
understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to
advance religious views that may conflict with the private
beliefs of the students and his or her family. Students in such
institutions are impressionable and their attendance is
involuntary... The State exerts great authority and coercive
power through mandatory attendance requirements, and
because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models
and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure.
482 U.S. at 584 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted), see also supra, note 167.
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protect their rights of conscience and must guard against such
abuses. The circumstances are quite different, however, when
student clubs are permitted to meet on school premises, without
any official endorsement, after the school day has ended and all
students are free to depart. At that juncture the school authorities,
by yielding space to student voluntary organizations for their
meetings, are likely to have established a "limited public forum"
from which particular viewpoints cannot be discriminatorily
excluded.
THE PUBLIC FORUM ISSUE

As noted above, the first issue identified by Justice Thomas
was whether the free speech rights of the Club, with its religious
character, had been violated by the refusal of the Milford school
authorities to allow it access to the school's limited public forum.
The Club's principal argument for access to Milford Central
School classrooms was based on public forum doctrine. The
contrast between Justice Thomas's approach to this subject and the
approach of the lower courts furnishes a fascinating illustration of
the elusive nature of this doctrine.
Under First Amendment public forum doctrine, a local
government, which owns property which it is not obliged to make
available for everyone's expressive use, can establish a "limited
93
public forum" permitting some uses but excluding others.'
Government officials, however, are not allowed to discriminate
between different viewpoints concerning the same subject
195
matter. 194 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,
the landmark case for students' free speech rights on public school
premises, the school authorities prohibited students from wearing
black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War because they
feared disturbances would result. 196 The school authorities'
position was undermined by the fact that they had permitted the
wearing of other political symbols, including even the Nazi Iron

193See

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; PerryEduc. Ass 'n., 460 U.S. at 37.
194 Barnette, 319 U.S.at 624.
'9' 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
'96 Id. at 504-05.
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Cross, in the past.1 97 Justice Fortas commented for the Court:
"Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at
least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not
constitutionally permissible."' 8 As the Second Circuit has stated,
"[T]he government is free to impose a blanket exclusion on certain
types of speech, but once it allows expressive activities of a certain
genre, it may not selectively deny access for other activities of that
genre.' 199
Justice Thomas wrote that the facts of Lamb's Chapel and
Rosenberger closely resembled the facts of Good News Club and
controlled its outcome. 200 In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that it
was unconstitutional for the New York school diistrict to exclude
from its school a church that wanted to present films teaching

family values from a Christian perspective, since the teaching of
family values was otherwise permissible under the rule governing
access to its limited public forum.20 ' It concluded that the district's
rule, which prohibited use by any group for religious purposes,
entailed impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 0 2 The Court
found Lamb's Chapel virtually indistinguishable from Good News
Club.2 °3
Similarly, the Court in Rosenberger held that the
University of Virginia had engaged in viewpoint discrimination
when a student organization was denied fbmcLing for printing
expenses because its publication, "Wide Awake", embodied a
197 Id. at

510.
'"Id.at 511.
'99 Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991)
(qted in Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 153).
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109-112.
201
Lamb's
202 id. Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
203 According to Justice Thomas, "[t]he only apparent difference between the
activity of Lamb's Chapel and the activities of the Good News Club is that the
Club chooses to teach moral lessons from a Christian perspective through live
storytelling and prayer, whereas Lamb's Chapel taught its lesson through films.
This distinction is inconsequential. Both modes of speech use a religious
viewpoint. Thus, the exclusion of the Good New Club's activities, like the
exclusion of Lamb's Chapel's films, constitutes uncorstitutional viewpoint
discrimination." GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 109-10.
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Christian viewpoint. 20 4 The denial of funding was unconstitutional
because the University, which funded a wide variety of student
publications with diverse viewpoints, "selected for disfavored
treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial
viewpoints." 20 5
The facts of both Lamb's Chapel and
Rosenberger, where public education institutions denied access or
benefits to a limited public forum because of the applicants'
religious character, are obviously similar to those of Good News
Club.
The Club based its claim of access to Milford Central
School classrooms on public forum doctrine. It argued that since
access to Milford Central School had been granted to the Boy
Scouts, Girl Scouts and 4-H Club, all of which aimed to inculcate
moral values in their student members, and it was engaged in
similar moral instruction, it must be granted similar access. 20 If it
were excluded from the limited public forum at Milford Central
School, it maintained that
this would constitute unconstitutional
20 7
viewpoint discrimination.
However, in 1992 Milford had adopted a "Community Use
Policy" which did not permit the use of school facilities for
religious purposes, and this was policy upheld by both lower
courts. Since no other religious group had been given access to
Milford Central School to hold its meetings, the defendants could
plausibly argue, and the lower courts agreed, that in excluding the
Club they had not engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination.208 District Judge McAvoy declared that the school
district's 1992 Community Use Policy, which created a limited
public forum, "is not anti-religious; it is intended to prohibit all
outside goups from using District facilities for religious
purposes. 20 9 He concluded that "the Good News' activities
constitute religious instruction that is conceptually of a different
genre than the secular subject matter dealt with by these other

204 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110 (citing Rosenberger).
205

Id. (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 13 1).

206 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
207 id.

201 Id.
at 154; Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 105.
209 Good News Club, 21 F.Supp.2d at 158
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clubs [the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and 4-H Club]." 21° The Second
Circuit agreed that the other clubs' activities did not remotely
resemble the religious instruction and prayer that the Club
provided, and therefore the Club's exclusion f"or Milford
Central
211
School's facilities "was based on content, not viewpoint."
Influenced by Establishment Clause precedent, the lower
courts no doubt felt uncomfortable at the idea of religious worship
in public school premises, even if conducted by a private group
after the school day had ended.212 It was impossible, however, to
deny the accuracy of the Club's statement that it engaged in the
moral education of its members, just like the Boy Scouts and Girl
Scouts. Accordingly, the lower courts tried to separate moral
training, which was permissible in public schools, from religious
instruction, which was not. Such a dichotomy is not only
impossible for devout Christians, whose entire moral code is
informed by, and has its sources in, religious faith, but it got the
lower courts tied up in conceptual knots.
Thus, District Judge McAvoy posed the basic issue in the
case as follows: "Is the content religious, a alleged by the
defendant? Or is the content non-religious, but presented from a
religious viewpoint, as alleged by the plaintiffs. . . ?,,2" After
summarizing in detail the Club's activities, he concluded that
"Good News is a religious organization whose p:roposed use deals
specifically with religious subject matter-and not, as plaintiffs
contend, merely a religious perspective on secular subject
210 id.
211
212

Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 511.
This may account for Judge Miner's studied disregard of the Supreme

Court's case which was most closely on point with the fact pattern in Good
News Club, i.e., Lamb's Chapel. While it might have been more congenial for
Judge Miner and the Second Circuit to ignore a Supreme Court decision which
had reversed them, as noted above, this drew the wrath of Justice Thomas. See
supra note 80. Judge Miner's evident discomfort with religious activities on
public school premises may have been due to his feeling that this would make

students of other religions feel like outsiders: "The activities of the Club clearly
and intentionally communicate Christian beliefs by teaching and by prayer, and
we think it eminently reasonable that the Milford school would not want to
communicate to students of other faiths that they were less welcome' than
students who adhere to the Club's teachings." Id. at 509.
213 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 150-51.
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matter." 214 Similarly, Circuit Judge Miner concluded that "the
Club's activities fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and
character development," 215 and the critical distinction to make was
"between the discussion of secular subjects from a religious
viewpoint and the discussion 216of religious material through
religious instruction and prayer."
The distinction between "religious content" and "nonreligious [content which is] presented from a religious viewpoint"
is fine indeed if not non-existent, as is the distinction between
"religious subject matter" and "a religious perspective on secular
subject matter." So is the distinction between "the discussion of
secular subjects from a religious viewpoint," on the one hand, and
"religious instruction" on the other. Indeed, these statements
sound like hair-splitting doubletalk. Plainly, dissenting Circuit
Judge Jacobs was correct when he stated that "[i]n my view, when
the subject matter is morals and character, it is quixotic to attempt
a distinction between religious viewpoints and religious subject
matters. 217
The Supreme Court, of course, concluded that Milford had
engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination against the
"religious viewpoint. ' 218
If one focuses on the mainfold
differences in belief between and among the various religions, the
idea of a generic "religious viewpoint" might seem incoherent. On
the other hand, despite their doctrinal differences, all devoutly
religious people share a common interest in not having their views
excluded from a limited public forum. Because of the invidious
2
"4 Id. at

160.
215 202 F.3d at 511. Believing Christians might well take exception to the
court's implications that the root of their moral and character development, their
faith
in Jesus Christ who is their supreme teacher, is "impure".
216 Id.
at 510 (citing Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 215).
217 Id. at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). The lower court judges were not the only
ones who experienced difficulty in categorizing the Good News Club's
activities: Justice Stevens said that it was religious speech "aimed principally at
proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious faith," Good News
Club, 533 U.S. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting), while Justice Souter labeled it
essentially "an evangelical service of worship." Id. at 138 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia took pleasure in pointing out the fact that the
dissenting justices could not agree on exactly what type of religious speech the
Good News Club was engaging in. Id. at 125 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"' Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120.
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discrimination against religiously oriented groups embodied in the
Milford access rule, which appears impossible to justify
conceptually, the Court's finding
of unconstitutional viewpoint
2 19
correct.
seems
discrimination
THE ISSUE OF GOVERNMENT ENDORSEMENT OF THE GOOD
NEWS CLUB AND COERCIVE PRESSURE OF PUPILS TO
PARTICIPATE

As noted above, Milford argued that children would
perceive that the school was endorsing the Club and would feel
coercive pressure to participate in its activities if permitted to meet
in school classrooms. In support of this claim, both Milford and
Justice Souter cited Edwards, in which the Supreme Court had
struck down Louisiana's "Creationism Act".2 20 Justice Brennan in
Edwards had emphasized the importance of keeping sectarian
influences out of the public school classroom, since "[s]tudents in
such institutions
are impressionable and their attendance is
22 1
involuntary."
What is perhaps most striking about Good News Club is
that for the first time, the Supreme Court has approved meetings on
public school premises by an explicitly religious club aimed at
grammar school children, i.e., six-to-twelve-year-olds. In doing
so, the Court appears to have dropped its traditional emphasis on
the impressionability of young children, which was supposed by
many to increase the danger of perceived government
endorsement, and consequently of an Establishment Clause
219

In public forum doctrine analysis, every "viewpoint" implicitly has its

opposite.

A key underlying question is how one defines the opposite of

"religion" in this context. One writer says that it is "antireligion," and this is
consistent with the views of the lower court judges in the Good News Club case.
Ruti Teitel, When Separate is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises,
Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 174

(Fall 1986).

She notes that Professors Laycock and McConnell, both

"accomodationists," have suggested that religion is not a subject matter but
instead a viewpoint, and hence intrinsically controversial. Id. at 189, 189 n. 91.
For them, (and apparently the majority in Good News Club), the opposite of
religion is "nonreligion." Id. at 182.
220

See supra note 192.

221 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583-84.
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violation, even if a religious group were merely afforded access to
public school premises without any government sponsorship or
direction.222 In addition, while the Club meetings occurred after
school and were not part of the official school program (or of an
official school function such as commencement exercises or
athletic events), they took place immediately after classes ended
and were directed at students at the school who were present
because they had just completed their classes.
In Edwards, of course, the state government used its
control of the public school curriculum to promote beliefs based on
religion in regular classes.223 The Milford Good News Club, in
contrast, enjoyed no official sponsorship by either state or local
authorities, nor was it seeking official endorsement of its
programs. It did not ask to meet during the school day or to affect
the school's curriculum. The authorities had denied the Club the
right to meet on school premises and there was no record of
teacher participation in or sponsorship of the Club.224 Justice
Thomas effectively distinguished Edwards from Good News Club
on this basis:
[T]he facts are simply too remote from those here..
* Edwards involved the content of the curriculum
taught by state teachers during the schoolday to
children required to attend.
Obviously, when
individuals who are not schoolteachers are giving
lessons after school to children permitted to attend
only with parental consent,22the
concerns expressed
5
present.
not
are
in Edwards
222

See, e.g., Teitel, supra note 219, at 178.
Edwards,482 U.S. at 583.
224 Unlike the Ohio Good News Club in Quappe, see supra note 184, public
223

school teachers apparently played no role in the Milford Good News Club.
According to the deposition testimony of Rev. and Mrs. Fournier, they
themselves conducted the club meetings when it met at their church, and there
was no indication in the record that this would change if they were allowed to
meet at the school.
225 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 116-17 (emphasis in original). Illinois ex rel.
Mc Collum, 333 U.S. 203, which Milford had cited for its position that the Good
News Club's religious objectives would be advanced by the state through

compulsory attendance laws, was distinguishable on similar grounds.
News Club, 533 U.S. at 116 n.6.
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Despite the fact that the Club had neither sought nor
received any official endorsement of its program, and it did not
seek to meet during the schoolday or to influence the school's
curriculum, Milford's attorneys argued that students at the school
would perceive that the school was endorsing the Club and would
feel coercive pressure to take part in its activities, since those
activities were to take place on school grounds. 226 As noted above,
Justice Thomas gave five reasons why this argument was
unpersuasive.227 The first reason was the neutrality principle,
which led Thomas to conclude that the Club deserved the same
right of access as other groups engaged in character training, like
the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts.228
The other factors Justice Thomas cited in rejecting this
argument focused on how its meetings were arrnged. The fact
that parents had to give permission before their children could
attend Club meetings219 certainly made it impossible to directly
coerce the children to attend, as Thomas noted, but this did not
take into account the possibility of considerable peer pressure for
them to do so. Of course, to the extent that such peer pressure
might exist, it is itself constitutionally protected if it consists of
purely private speech and is something the listener must expect in
a society which protects freedom of speech.23 °
Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113-14,
See supra discussion accompanying notes 96-120.
221 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114.
229 Id. at 115. This was conceded by Justice Souter. .d. alt 142 n.4 (Souter, J.,
226
227

dissenting).
230 Justice Scalia's comment on this connection correctly states First
Amendment doctrine:
As to coercive pressure: Physical coercion is not at: issue here;
and so-called "peer pressure," if it can even been [sic]
considered coercion, is, when it arises from private activities,

one of the attendant consequences of a freedom of association
that is constitutionally protected... What is at play here is not
coercion, but the compulsion of ideas....
Id. at 121 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted), Children belonging to
religious minorities might, of course, feel self-conscious about the fact that
many of their peers have enthusiastically joined a club to which they cannot
assent. But there is no majority religion in the United States, and every single
religion is a minority in some parts of the country. We all must learn to tolerate
and even to respect the expression of views and beliefs with which we
fundamentally disagree. It is futile to attempt to create a religion-free zone in
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Justice Thomas was also correct in distinguishing the other
cases Milford cited in support of its argument that children would
be subjected to subtle coercive pressures if the Club were allowed
to meet on school premises. He emphasized that all of those case,
unlike Good News Club, involved either official activities during
the regular school day2 31 or else an important official school
function. 232 In addition to the fact that the Club's meetings were
held after the end of the school day, other factors negated any
appearance of official endorsement of the Club's activities by the
school authorities: the Club met in high school or middle school
rooms, not in one of the classrooms of its elementary school
members; the children varied in ages, unlike the situation in the
typical elementary school classroom; and the instructors were not
schoolteachers. 233 Thus, there was no objective basis for the
Milford schoolchildren to perceive official endorsement of the
Club's meetings here, while "hostility toward the religious
viewpoint" might be perceived if it were excluded. 3 Under these
circumstances, it would be wrong to tailor Establishment Clause
jurisprudence to the possible subjective misperceptions of the
youngest children.235
Justice Souter appeared unable to refute these points
persuasively.
He emphasized what he called significant
differences between Good News Club and Rosenberger, Lamb's
Chapel and Widmar, the cases on which the majority had relied.
Lamb's Chapel involved an evening film series on child-rearing
open to the general public, whereas the Club meetings were open
only to elementary grammar school children and were held
immediately following the end of the school day.236 Widmar and
Rosenberger not only involved university students, who were
public schools, and the First Amendment does not permit us to try to do so.
Thus, religious free speech by private individuals must be protected even in
public schools, so long as the rights of atheists, dissenters and minority religions
are sedulously protected.
2" Edwards, 482 U.S. at 578; Illinois ex rel. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 203;

Mergens, 496 U.S. at 226; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 203.
232

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 290; Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.

23

Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 116-18.

234
Id. at
23
1Id. at
236 Id. at

118.
119.

144 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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much less impressionable than six-to-twelve year-olds, but the fact
that the respective forums in those cases were open to a wide range
of differing ideologies and groups with diverse views negated any
possible inference that the university was endursing the religious
use in question..237 Souter reasoned that "[t]he tiigadfnt
timing and format
of Good News's gatherings, on the other hand, may well
affirmatively suggest that imprimaturof officialdom in the minds
of the young children", because it was one of only four outside
groups identified as meeting in the school, and was evidently the
only one which met right after the end of the: school day.238 He
concluded that
there is a good case that Good News's exercises
blur the line between public classroom instruction
and private religious indoctrination,, leaving a
reasonable elementary school pupil unable to
appreciate that the former instruction is the business
of the school while the latter evangelism is not.
Thus, the facts we know (or think we know) point
away from the majority's conclusion ....
Souter's
one important
point
is the greater
impressionability of young children; he did not, however,
convincingly demonstrate the significance of that impressionability
in this context or why the children would be unable to distinguish
between the Club's evangelism and the regular school classes
which preceded it. He ignored the fact that the Club's meetings
were held away from elementary school classrooms and presided
over by outsiders instead of schoolteachers, both factors which
reinforce the dividing line between public classroom instruction
and private religious indoctrination. Souter's stress on the fact that
only three other outside groups (the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts and 4H Club) met at Milford School is irrelevant: the facts of the case
disclose no effort by the authorities to exclude other outside groups
in a discriminatory manner, so the Club should not be penalized

237

Id. at 143.

238 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 144 (emphasis in original).
239

Id. at 144-45.
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merely because other outside groups have not taken advantage of
the same opportunities as it has.24 0
In summary, while the facts of Good News Club made it a
case of first impression, the Supreme Court's holding in the case is
a natural outgrowth of its free speech jurisprudence. While the
Court has continued to outlaw any kind of official endorsement of
religion as a violation of the Establishment Clause,2 41 it has
continued to protect private free speech, and even religious speech,
on public premises. On the whole, the possibility that even
impressionable elementary school children would feel coercive
pressure to participate in the Club's activities or perceive that
Milford School was officially endorsing the Club seems greatly
exaggerated. Therefore, the Court's traditional strong support for
freedom of speech properly trumped the chimera of establishment
arising from permitting religious speech in a public school
building.
CONCLUSION

The issues in Good News Club lie at the confluence of
two
important streams of First Amendment jurisprudence: freedom of
speech and separation of government and religion. For the past
forty years, the Supreme Court has elaborated and implemented the
principle that the Establishment Clause requires that no one, much
less children whose attendance at school is mandated by
compulsory attendance laws, should be subjected to indoctrination
by an arm of government in the tenets of a particular religion or
even to government endorsement of religion in general. During

240 Justice Thomas made this point in an incisive response to Justice Souter:

Justice SOUTER suggests that we cannot determine whether
there would be an Establishment Clause violation unless we
know when, and to what extent, other groups use the facilities.
When a limited public forum is available for use by groups
presenting any viewpoint, however, we would not find an
Establishment Clause violation simply because only groups
presenting a religious viewpoint have opted to take advantage
of the forum at a particular time.
Id. at 119 n.9.
241 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 290; Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.
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the same period, the Court has reaffirmed its staunch support for
robust freedom of speech for varying viewpoints in public forums.
In most instances, public school authorities have tried to
conform school programs and practices to constitutional
requirements and to avoid Establishment Clause violations. In the
zealous endeavor to root out any instance of official endorsement
of religion from public schools, however, some state and local
governments, including those in New York, went too far. Use of
public school premises by outside groups has been widely
permitted for many years. Faced with the obviously delicate
situation of outside religious groups desiring access to public
school property to hold their meetings and programs, many
governments took the easy way out and totally excluded such
groups. Such bans, however, do not fit comfortably with the
Court's freedom of speech jurisprudence. Just as barring even the
mention of God and religion as permissible subjects of discourse in
the schools could violate the freedom of speech of religious
students, so also the exclusion of outside religious groups from
public school premises after hours while welcoming all other kinds
of outside groups appears to constitute impermissible contentbased discrimination against religion.
The Supreme Court has moved in recent years towards a
synthesis and reconciliation of its free speech and establishment
clause jurisprudence.
On the one hand, it has sedulously
prohibited any kind of practice, including prayer at school
programs outside the school day, which might appear to provide
official endorsement of religion. On the other hand, it has sharply
distinguished officially sponsored or endorsed religious speech in
the schools from genuinely private religious speech in the same
location. In protecting the latter, it has done no more than to
logically extend its staunch defense of the right of free speech on
controversial topics, including religion, to public forums which had
become discriminatorily religion-free zones.
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